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Thesis dated May, 1987
The purpose of this thesis is to examine Saudi
Arabian politics and describe the process for making
oil policy decisions. It will argue that the House of Saud
used oil as an instrument to protect their dynasty. Given
this as the crux of the study, we v/ill use content analysis
to examine closely statements issued by Saudi officials. VJe
will also chronicle events that are relevant to the oil
policy process. Our time span for this study will be the
ten-year period from 1970 through 1980. Our study will
demonstrate that the enduring objective of oil policy in




Table of Contents ii
List of Tables iii
List of Maps and Figures iv
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. DEVELOPMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA'S POLITICAL
SYSTEM AND IDEOLOGY 2 4
III. SAUDI ARABIA OIL POLICY: AN ANALYSIS 40
IV. CONCLUSIONS 57
APPENDIX A 66
King Abdulaziz's Sons Names According
to Age.
APPENDIX B gg





1.1 Member Status of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries 13
1.2 Proved Reserves of Crude Oil and Natural
Gas of the World, Year End, 1982 15
1.3 World Crude Oil Production, 1973-81
(Millions of Barrels Per Day) 17
1.4 International Financial Reserves of OPEC
Countries, 1982 18
1.5 Saudi Arabian Government Revenues
Fiscal Years 1975-1976 to 1980-1981 19
2.1 Major Governors in Saudi Arabia by Districts.. 31
2.2 Saudi Arabian Political Administrative
Structure (1987 ) 34
2.3 Mechanics of Political Administrative
Control in the Kingdom 36
3.1 Saudi Oil Production 1978-80 49
iii
LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES
MAPS PAGE
1.1 Saudi Arabia: Major Cities and Borders... 3
1.2 Tribal Map of Saudi Arabia 10
FIGURE




The creation of Saudi Arabia in 1932 by King Abdulaziz
was the start of a modern Saudi Arabia. King Abdulaziz had
devoted his life to regaining the kingdom of his father
since early 1900, and he made sure that this time the
kingdom was here to stay.^ The creation was based primarily
upon Arabian tradition, that of a tribal legacy among the
Arabian tribes. Saudi Arabia today marks the beginning of
its third ascent to power. In the first two ascents to
2
power, the House of Saud flourished, only to be twice laid
3
low, first by external then by internal forces. The Saudis'
history is important to this study because the main actor
is the House of Saud. The Saudis' foreign and domestic
policies are in turn formulated to protect the continuity
of King Abdulaziz' throne.
Saudi Arabia today occupies about four-fifths of the
Arabian peninsula, a total area of 865,000 square miles,
K.S. Tv;itchell, Saudi Arabia (Princeton,
New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 155-172.
2
House of Saud refers to male progenies of
King Abdulaziz, especially the senior princes. They
control the monarchy as well as make the final decisions
in political and socioeconomic matters.
3
David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1982), p. 8.
2
4
and has an estimated population of 8 million. it is
bordered on the north by Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait; on
the east by the Arabian Gulf, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and Oman; on the south by People's Yemen and
North Yemen; and on the west by the Red Sea and the Gulf
of Aqaba (see Map 1.1).
When King Abdulaziz came to power in 1902, the
economy of Saudi Arabia was based on the oasis, villages
for agricultural products, the Bedouins' animal products,
and revenues from pilgrimages to Mecca and Madina.
Basically, the country was poor, illiterate, and seedy.^
A shortage of resources plagued Abdulaziz from the
earliest days of his political career. State income
was $50,000 a year in the first decade of the century,
$100,000 in the second, and $5 million in 1930.
Saudi Arabia has been blessed with oil; however,
its geographic location in the Middle East is less than
a blessing. The division within the Arab world, the
creation of Israel in Palestine in 1948, the Soviet
Union's closeness, and the radical movements seizing
political power in surrounding border countries resulted
These figures are not accurate, as no census
has been taken.
5
Ali Rustum, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy




Saudi Arabia: Major Cities and Borders
4
in the Saudis' pursuit of a stable Middle East free of
radicalism and socialism. It also seeks strong cooperation
with Western countries who can provide a security umbrella
under which the regime as well as other conservative
allies in the region can hope to prosper.
Oil is the key to Saudi Arabia's future. It creates
affluence, status in the international community, and,
paradoxically, many of the country's dilemmas and concerns.
Thus, great wealth is intermeshed with great danger. For
oil is not only prosperity and power, it has also become
a magnet that draws an energy-conscious world toward the
Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia, in the center of this complex
area, is trapped in the complexities of inter-Arab politics.
Virtually every movement, party, or faction in the Arab
world has at one time or another sought to placate,
overthrow, or enlist the support of the Saudi regime.
With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Saudis
have been playing it safe by projecting anti-Israeli
rhetoric publicly, while in practical terms avoiding
deep involvement. Saudis see themselves as the champion
of Islam, the defenders of the Islamic holy places of
Mecca and Medina. In superpower politics, the regime has,
for nearly a generation, been firmly on the side of the
United States. It maintains no diplomatic or economic
relations with the Soviet Union.
The Saudis' foreign policy subserves domestic
stability. In the following pages, we will seek to
5
examine Saudis' oil policy. However, since oil creates
prestige in the international community and prosperity
internally, we will aim to analyze enduring objectives
and the process of formulating oil policies.
This study argues that a thorough understanding of
the Saudis' oil policy requires;
1. A review of the historical antecedent of
the kingdom; and
2. An analysis of the peculiarity of its
political system.
This chapter presents Saudi Arabian history while
Chapter II analyzes the political system. Chapter III
examines and analyzes pertinent oil policies. Conclusions
and a prognosis are offered in Chapter IV.
The history of Saudi Arabia started with the
establishment of the first Saudi empire. The first House
of Saud was established in the early sixteenth century in
the city of Daraiya in the middle of the Arabian
7
peninsula. During the early part of the eighteenth
0
century (1747) Sheik Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahab allied
Holden and Johns, The House of Saud, pp. 19-20.
8
Muhammad Ibn Abdulwahab was a Muslim revivalist
and the founder of the Wahabism movement in the Arabian
peninsula (See John Philby, Saudi Arabia). This movement
could be compared to the Calvinist movement in Europe.
6
himself with Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud, the Amir "Prince" of
Daraiya. Ibn Saud agreed to protect Ibn Abdulwahab in his
9
call for Islamic reforms. This alliance continues today.
To ensure the call for Islamic reform, Ibn Adulwahab
depended of Ibn Saud for protection. In the same manner,
Ibn Saud used the Wahabism movement to gain legitimacy
among the Arabian tribes in the Arabian peninsula. The
policy of interdependence was pursued by both leaders to
get to different goals. Ibn Saud' s goal v/as to extend
his control over the Arabian Peninsula, while Ibn Abdulwahab's
goal was to expand his religious reforms over the
peninsula. Ibn Saud's knowledge of the Bedouins and his
astute use of the Wahabism movement proved to be extremely
helpful tools as he conquered most of the Arabian peninsula
and claimed for himself the right to rule throughout the
newly conquered territories.^^
The domination of the House of Saud over the Arabian
Peninsula and especially the holy places of the Muslim
world resulted in direct confrontation with the Othman
empire. As a result, Muhammad Ali, the governor of
Egypt, under the order of the Sultan of the Othman empire
Al-Yassini Ayman, Religion and State jn the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview




invaded the Saudi empire. By 1818, the empire was
demolished, and the capital city of Daraiya was razed.
The House of Saud never accepted the fact that its
role in the peninsula was finished. In 1830, the second
Saudi empire came into existence under the leadership of
Prince Turki Ibn Abdullah Ibn Saud. Turki's son, Faisal,
took over after the death of his father and managed to
regain most of the Saudis' territories. Prince Turki
had to deal with the Othman empire's invasion again
until his death in 1865. His sons struggled over the
succession. As a result, in 1884, Muhammad Ibn Rasheed,
from the Shammar tribe in the north of the peninsula,
12
destroyed the second Saudi empire.
Abdulruhaman Ibn Saud, the father of King Abdulaziz,
made some efforts to regain the family power in the area.
In 1891, Prince Abdulruhaman ruled Riyadh, now the capital
of Saudi Arabia, until he was defeated by Ibn Rasheed's
forces and was driven into exile in Kuwait, where his
family lived as guests of its Sheikh and ruler,
Ibn Sabah.
Robert Lacey, The Kingdom (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1981), pp. 60-62.
12
George Kheiraliah, Arabia Reborn (Albuquerque,
New Mexico: The University of New Mexico Press, 1952),
pp. 67-69.
13
Gary Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia
(London: Frank Cass, 1976), p. 11.
8
The idea of restoring the House of Saud and gaining
power in the peninsula did not fade away, but remained
in the minds of the Saudis who survived the Rasheed forces
and fled to Kuwait. In 1901, Prince Abdulaziz left Kuwait
secretly with forty men and went to the middle of the
Arabian peninsula. By 1902, he seized the city of Riyadh,
killed the local governor and announced the return of the
14
House of Saud. In the early 1900's, the western part
of the peninsula was controlled by the Hashimate family
with the support of the Othman empire. The east was
controlled by the Turkish or Othman empire. The south
was controlled by the Yamen, and the north and central
were controlled by Ibn Rashid.The peninsula had
suffered for centuries from the struggle among the tribes
for political power, a struggle which rarely resulted in
unity. The tribes were always contending with one another
over control of the peninsula.
It took King Abdulaziz thirty years from the capture
of Riyadh in 1902 to transform the whole territory of
Saudi Arabia into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There was
Irvine Anderson, ARAMCO, The United States and
Saudi Arabia (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1981), pp. 5-7.
15
John Philby, Saudi Arabia (London; Ernest
Benn Limited, 1955), pp. 237-264.
16
Rustum, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy, p. 3.
9
heavy fighting with the House of Rashid, the House of
Hashimate, other Arab tribes, and the Othman empire
(see Map 1.2).
For King Abdulaziz to create a national identity
and to gain the full support of the important tribes he
defeated, he used two very successful methods. First,
as the first two Saudi empires did, he created the
18
Ikhwan army under his leadership with Islam as their
19
ideology. Second, he married the daughters of the
tribal chiefs.
On May 29, 1933, King Abdulaziz signed an agreement
with Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) whereby the
company, which was later called the Arabian American Oil
Company (ARAMCO), had the right to explore for oil in the
21
east province of Saudi Arabia. The initial agreement
Peter Hobday, Saudi Arabia Today (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 28.
18
Ikhwan was a movement inspired by a fanatical
ideal of Islam and the teaching of Wahabism. The Ikhwan
was the most dominant force and factor in the creation
of Saudi Arabia. However, the conflict started in 1928
between the Ikhwan and Ibn Saud over control and
distinction of the country. Thus, in 1930 in the
Battle of Sibila, Ibn Saud defeated the Ikhwan. See
Lackner.
Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand (London:
Ithaca Press, 1978), pp. 21-30.
20
John E. Metcalf, Saudi Arabia (New York;
First National Bank, 1974), p. 8.
21
Lackner, A House Built on Sand, p. 30.
10
MAP 1.2







was that SOCAL would pay the king a $50,000 gold down
payment, a sum which relieved the region's immediate
problems. The company was given the exclusive right
to explore, prospect, drill for, extract, manufacture,
transport, and export all oil produced. The company
agreed to build a refinery, supply the government with
200,000 gallons of gasoline and 100,000 gallons of
kerosene yearly, and advance loans deductible from future
royalties which were fixed at four gold shillings per ton
of crude oil. Also the company received a sixty-year
22
concession for all Saudi Arabia's oil. Signing the
oil exploration agreement with SOCAL rescued Saudi Arabia
from financial disaster. Since then, oil has become
23
the dominant feature of the economy. Today, ARAMCO
is owned by four American corporations in the following
proportions: Standard Oil Company of California,
30 percent; Texas Company, 30 percent; Standard Oil
Company (New Jersey), 30 percent; and Mobile Oil Company,
in 4-2410 percent.
The first discovery of oil came on October 16, 1937,
and the first commercial production of 2,130 barrels
Twitchell, Saudi Arabia, pp. 223-224.
Lackner, A House Built on Sand, pp. 33-34.
24
Rustum, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy, p. 14.
12
25
was on October 16, 1938. This discovery of oil in
Saudi Arabia opened the country to the world. Especially
during the period before the discovery of oil, the Saudi
people lived in comparative isolation from the rest of
the world. No powerful country had any kind of interest
in the land or its people. While most Arab states were
being swept by various ideological currents of nationalism,
socialism, and communism, Saudi Arabia remained attached
2 6
to its strict interpretation of Islam.
In the early period of the 1960's, the kingdom
became known in the international arena, and, of course,
oil is the key to the existing Saudis' status in the
international community. However, the real importance
of oil became apparent in the early 1970's. In September
1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) was founded by Saudi Arabia and four oil exporting
countries with the objective of pursuing a common policy
toward the oil companies or the oil importing countries
27
in order to protect their rightful interests. Now
its members include 13 countries (see Table 1.1).
Ibid., p. 11.
26
Anderson, ARAMCO, The United States and
Saudi Arabia, pp. 90-96.
27
Fouad Alfarsy, Saudi Arabia; A Case Study






























SOURCE: Fouad Alfarsy, Saudi Arabia: A Case
Study in Development, p. 53.
14
Saudi Arabian oil power is the result of three
factors; (1) massive oil reserves; (2) variety in
production; and (3) huge money reserves. Saudi Arabia's
global prestige is enhanced as a result of these three
factors. First, the oil reserve is nearly 162 billion
2 8barrels or approximately one-fourth of the world total.
(See Table 1.2 and Figure 1.1.) Second, the ability to
vary production between 5 and 12 million barrels per day
without difficulty and the capacity to produce 12 million
29
barrels per day gave the Saudis a tool to control oil
flow to the world (see Table 1.3). Third, the Saudis
accumulated huge money reserves of about $160 billion
from 1974 to 1980^*^ (see Table 1.4). This reserve was
the result of oil revenues so massive that the Saudis
could not find ways to spend them (see Table 1.5).
The outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973
led to the Saudis and other Arab oil producing countries
announcing an embargo on oil shipments to the United
States and the Netherlands for their support of Israel,
Qaundt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's
(Washington, D.C.; Brooking Institutions, 1981), p. 3.
29
Donald Moliver, The Economy of Saudi Arabia
(New York; Praeger, 1980), p. 26.
30
"The Arabs and Petrodollars," Wall Street
Journal, 13 December 1985, p. 5.
15
TABLE 1.2
Proved Reserves of Crude Oil and Natural Gas












United Kingdom 14 25
















Saudi Arabia 162 117
South Africa 0 0
Syria 2 1
United Arab Emirates 32 29
Venezuela 22 54
Communist Countries






North Korea 0 0
Yugoslavia Negl 1
SOURCE: Joan Spero, The Politics of International
Economic Relations (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1985), p. 308.
FIGURE 1.1
Percentages of Proven Oil Reserves in the World
Ot^r' S>o' Eait 5otr<ef Unroo
SOURCE: Moliver, The Economy of Saudi Arabia, p 262
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TABLE 1.3
World Crude Oil Production, 1973-81
(Millions of Barrels Per Day)
1973 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Oil Exporting Countries 31.1 31.7 30.6 31.5 27.8 23.8
Saudi Arabia 7.6 9.2 8.3 9.5 9.9 9.8
Iran, Islamic
Republic of 5.9 5.7 5.4 3.1 1.7 1.4
Venezuela 3.4 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.1
Indonesia 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Nigeria 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.4
United Arab Emirates 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.5
Iraq 2.0 2.5 2.9 3.6 2.8 1.2
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.2
Algeria 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0
Kuv/ait 3.0 2.0 2.1 2.5 1.7 1.1
Oman 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Qatar 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Natural Gas Liquids
Output 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Other Developing Countries
Net Oil Exporters 2.8 4.6 5.3 5.8 6.4 6.7
Mexico 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.6
China 1.1 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0
Egypt 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6
Malaysia 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Other 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3
Net Oil Importers 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.7
Argentina 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Brazil 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0-2
India 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Romania 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Other 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Industrial Countries 13.8 13.3 14.1 14.7 14.8 14.8
United States 11.0 9.9 10.3 10.2 10.2 10.2
Canada 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.6
United Kingdom — 0.8 1.1 1.6 1.7 1.8
Norway -- 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Australia 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Other 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Other Countries 9.1 11.4 11.9 12.2 12.5 12.5
U.S.S.R. 8.6 11.0 11.5 11.8 12.1 12.2
Other 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
TOTAL 58.3 62.5 63.4 65.7 63.0 59.5


















United Arab Emirates 3,278
Venezuela 7,021
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an embargo which resulted in an increase of oil prices.
But, in 1976, when OPEC, meeting in Doha, Qatar, called
for a 10 percent price increase in oil prices, the Saudis
rejected the offer, then went along with the increase.
In return, other OPEC members agreed to freeze prices
for the rest of 1977. The Saudis kept their production
high throughout the year, averaging 9.2 million barrels
32
per day. in December 1978, Saudi production was at
10.4 million to offset the collapse of Iranian exports
33
due to the revolution. in January 1979, the Saudis
cut their production to 9.5 million barrels per day and
remained at that level almost all year, which resulted
in a sharp price increase. In addition, the Saudis
34
undersold the other OPEC members. However, in 1980,
the Saudis again increased their production to 10.4
million bpd after the Iran-Iraqi war took place to make
35
up for the oil lost from both countries.
Richard Mattione, OPEC's Investments and
International Finance System (Washington, D.C.:
Brooking Institutions, 1985), p. 39.
32




Paul Stern, " Saudi Arabia's Oil Policy—Its
Origins, Implementation and Implications," in ed
Tim Niblock, State, Society and Economy in Saudi
Arabia (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1982), p.l20.
35
Qaundt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's, pp. 131-132.
21
We can see here the contradictory oil policies by
the Saudis through this ten-year period from 1970
through 1980 which will be the time span of our study.
We will look to these conflicting decisions to find an
answer or answers to the main question here: what is
or are the objectives behind the Saudi oil policies.
This ten-year period should permit a thorough
understanding of the dynamics of Saudi Arabia's decision
making process. Since policy making for oil in Saudi
Arabia in a matter of highest secrecy, we need, at the
outset, to emphasize that decisions in Saudi Arabia are
the prerogative of the king. There are, however, two
systems of advisement - the first is a "high committee"
of royal princes and the second is the Council of
Ministers. Only the high committee is involved in oil
policy deliberations.
Because motivations and reasons behind the Saudis'
policies are difficult to discern, we will utilize both
the political and economic approaches to analyze
decisions. In other words, we shall look for political
and economic reasons to interpret the Saudis' policies.
However, the data bank is very limited. Hence, the
following shall constitute our resources: newspapers
such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times;
magazines such as Newsweek and Time; books which have
22
been published either directly or indirectly on Saudi
Arabia; journals such as Sout Altaliah, a quarterly
published in Arabic; and non-published theses written
by Saudi Arabian students.
Although many books have been published on Saudi
Arabia, most are historical and descriptive. On the
other hand, fewer books are available on the Saudis'
political, economic or sociological system. These
studies can be divided into two groups. The first group,
the majority, is composed of those who conclude that
the Saudis' oil policy is a result of national interests,
Pan-Arabian interests, and/or Islamic interests. However,
all the members of this group share one characteristic:
all are either foreigners who traveled to Saudi Arabia
to conduct their studies and collect their data or
Saudi Arabian citizens who dare not criticize their
government. The foreigners, who were graciously treated
by Saudi officials, include such authors as William
Quandat, Ali Rustum, Robert Lacey, David Holden, and
Richard Johns. Saudis in this group include Alawaji
and Alfarsy.
The second group is composed of those who see the
Saudis’ oil policy as a continuation of imperialism
in the third world. This group includes Lackner and
the journal Sout Altaliah, which specializes in studying
23
Saudi Arabia. The relative lack of objective books on
the Saudis' political, economic, and sociological
systems may be a result of Islamic induced reticence
toward Western researchers. I, therefore, hope that
this study will contribute to a critical understanding
of the Saudis' politics and policy process. To analyze
the available data, we will use the content analysis
method to describe and analyze Saudi Arabian oil policy.
The first step in our analysis involves a close look
at statements issued by Saudi officials as well as
available data on oil production and pricing. We shall
also chronicle events that are relevant to the oil policy
process and use secondary analysis to support and
strengthen our study. Ultimately, then, through a
detailed process of inference and explication, we plan
to demonstrate that the enduring objective of oil policy
in Saudi Arabia is the durability of the throne of
Abdulaziz.
24
II. DEVELOPMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA'S
POLITICAL SYSTEM AND IDEOLOGY
As important as it is to understand the process
whereby the Saudi Arabian state was formed, it is
equally important to understand the development of the
state's political system and ideology. This will
provide the reader with a full understanding of the
decision making process in Saudi Arabia, important
actors, and the evolution of a unique Saudi political
system. Prior to the 20th Century, Saudi Arabia was
purely a tribal society, and it has never been occupied
by an colonial power.
The process of consolidation passed through three
phases. The first phase began in the early years of the
kingdom and continued to 1953 when King Abdulaziz
remained the sole authority. This period was based on
the traditional patriarchial authority. Max Weber speaks
of the head of this authority as:
one who has no administrative staff and no
machinery to enforce his will....The members
of the household stand in an entirely personal
relation to him. They obey him and he commands
them in the belief that his right and their
duty are part of the inviolable order that has
the sanctity of immemorial tradition.
Lackner, A House Built on Sand, p. 74.
37
Max Weber, The Theory of Social Organization
(New York: Free Press, 1947), pp. 330-331.
25
In this early period of the regime, the legitimacy
of the House of Saud was based on a combination of
3 8
charismatic and traditional elements. ibn Saud used
his charisma to mobilize both the Bedouins and the
religious leaders. He invoked his family's traditional
domination over the area to justify his conquests and
the consolidation of his power. Two social groups
struggled for control of the society during this first
phase. The first, an eclectic mixture of ethnics is
referred to as tribal groups. Each had its own leader.
The House of Saud was the strongest militarily. After
the initial military conquest, however. King Abdulaziz
had to convert military victory to loyalty. In effect
the serfs were to become citizens. He achieved this
objective by marrying into all the tribes and by
carefully distributing subsidies to everyone in the
39
kingdom.
The second group consisted of the Ulama, Islamic
scholars and theologians who played a major role as
spiritual legitimators of political authority. The Ulama
For a study of Ibn Saud's charismatic
authority see Bakr Omar Kashmeer, "Ibn Saud: The
Arabian National Builder," Ph.d Dissertation, Howard
University, Washington, D.C., 1973.
39
Lackner, A House Built on Sand, p. 57.
26
acted as a mediator between the rulers and their
40
subjects. To this day, the legitimacy of the House
of Saud has been intimately linked with the religious
41
and social message of Wahhabism.
The Saudis of the first period survived without
any elaborate administrative institutions. Ibn Saud
ruled personally and informally and used the traditional
Majlis where the Ulama and the tribal leaders come to
meet the king to discuss personal issues and country
42
affairs, and to pledge their full support to the king.
The king also adopted a strategy of relying on personal
advisors, most of whom were foreign, to help him know
what was taking place in the outside world. Those
advisors included Philby from Britain, Kamal Adham from
43
Turkey, Rashad Pharaoun from Syria and many more.
Thus, in the first phase of the House of Saud's development
into a modern nation-state, the king dominated the
decision making process, though he sought the advice of
Ayman Al-Yassini, Religion and State in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 49.
41
James Buchan, "Secular and Religious Opposition
in Saudi Arabia," in Tim Niblock, State, Society, and
Economy in Saudi Arabia, p. 107.
42
Majlis is a traditional Arabian living room
which only men can use to relax or to welcome their
guests.
43
Ayman Al-Yassini, Religion and State in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 59.
the Ulama, tribal leaders and his personal advisors.
He also sought their help in implementing new policies.
The second phase, from 1955 to 1974 saw the
establishment of a modern administrative structure.
In October 1953, the first Saudi Arabian Council of
Ministers was formed under the order of King Abdulaziz
who was very sick and felt the need to divide the
country's affairs among his sons and close friends to
prevent conflict after his death. A few weeks later,
after the creation of the Council of Ministers,
44
King Abdulaziz on November 9, 1953, died. The Council
of Ministers was to be the central agency for all
45
existing and future departments and agencies. it,
therefore, centralized decision making among the princes
The council was dominated by the senior princes who
served as ministers and advisors. Others, personal
advisors to the king, also attended council meetings at
the king's request. The king is the head of the council
and in his absence the crown prince takes over. In this
Alexander Bligh, From Prince to King
(New York: New York University Press, 1984),
pp. 56-60.
45
Ayman Al-Yassini, Religion and State in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 65.
28
phase, the dominant group was the king and the senior
princes, and the subordinate group was the Ulama and
46
the tribal leaders. Two kings - King Saud (1953-1964)
and King Faisal (1964-1974) ruled in this phase. It
was King Faisal who first announced the constitution
of the kingdom in this statement:
Our constitution is the Koran, and our law
is the Shariah of Mohammad (God's peace and
blessing be upon him), our system of government
is based on the interest of this country where
such interest does not conflict with the
principle of our religion and the Shariah.
Religion was still central to the regime's
legitimation process. However, the Ulama was incorporated
into the new state administration, making it more
organized and controllable. Its activities were
channeled through the following ministries and agencies:
(1) The committees for commanding the good
and forbidding evil;
(2) The Directorate of Religious Research
(consisting of the Iftewa, meaning
"interpretation," and D'awa, meaning
"preaching," and guidance);
(3) Religious education;
(4) The Ministry of Justice; and
4 8
(5) The agency that supervises girls' education.
Qaundt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's, p. 80.
47
Rustum, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy, p. 4.
48
Ayman Al-Yassini, Religion and State in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 68.
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The Ulama continued to be a mediator between the
king and his subjects. For example, in 1955 with the
expansion of Arab nationalism from Egypt, the Ulama
issued an Iftewa forbidding Saudis from going to school
4 9
abroad and thus diminishing the Nasserist influence.
The Ulama's influence was not as great during this period
as during King Abdulaziz' reign. However, the Ulama
had regular weekly meetings with the king, held on
Thursday afternoons, where views were exchanged and
50
policies coordinated, and they played a major role
in regulating social behavior.
For example, a program for female education was
proposed in this period, but it was opposed by the Ulama.
A compromise between the Ulama and the House of Saud
allowed the Ulama to oversee the program.This
continues today.
On the other hand. King Faisal's strong grip on
the country and his dominant role in the policy process
was shown in 1965 when he ordered internal security
Lackner, A House Built on Sand, p. 60.
50
Derek Hopwood, "The Ideological: Ibn
Abdalwahhab's Muslim Revivalism," in Niblock,
State, Society, and Economy in Saudi Arabia, p. 107.
51
Ayman Al-Yassini, Religion and State in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p. 129.
30
forces to shoot Prince Khald Ibn Musaid and his fanatical
religious followers who opposed the construction of a
television station by preventing the workers from doing
their jobs.^^
In the case of the tribal leaders and their
tribesmen, the House of Saud established a new channel
within the new administrative institutions. They were
still expected to protect the House of Saud, but they
became less involved in overall policy making. The
tribal leaders continued to receive their subsidies.
However, the king was no longer as accessible as before
because the new administrative structure required full
attention from the king. Thus, King Faisal could not
see his subjects as did King Abdulaziz in the first
period. However, in this period, the position of
governor was introduced and institutionalized whereby
today all major cities in Saudi Arabia are run by a
governor. Those governors are senior princes and their
job is, as in King Abdulaziz' era, to have the majlis
where the Ulama and the tribal leaders come to discuss
53
their problems (see Table 2.1).
Lackner, A House Built on Sand, p. 69.
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"How Saudi Arabia is Ruled," Sout Altaliah,
May 1973, pp. 59-65.
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TABLE 2.1
Major Governors in Saudi Arabia by Districts
DISTRICT GOVERNOR
Riyadh Prince Salman Ibn Abduluziz
Qassim Prince Abdullah Ibn Abduluziz
Eastern Province Prince Muhummad Ibn Fahd
Tabouk Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz
Mecca Prince Majid Ibn Abduluziz
Madina Prince Abdul Majid Ibn Abduluziz
Hial Prince Mugrin Ibn Abduluziz
Najran Prince Kalid Al Sudairy
Alahassah Prince Fahd Ibn Julwi
Assir Prince Kalid Ibn Faisal
Jaizan Prince Mohammad Al Sudairy
Al Jauf Prince Abdulrahman Al Sudairy
SOURCE: This is derived by the author from Historical
Records at the Saudi Embassy, Washington, D.C.
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The government also established the National Guard,
which is entrusted with domestic security and is
responsible for guarding palaces, oil wells, and other
vital institutions. Recruitment to the National Guard
is based on each tribe sending a fixed quota of men to
serve as a distinct unit. The tribes thus become
incorporated into the system as an instrument of
coercion. The National Guard is currently headed by
54
Crown Prince Abdullah.
In this period, we perceive changes in the Saudis'
kingdom from a non-institutional government during
King Abdulazi2' reign to an administrative-institutional-
ized government during the reigns of Kings' Saud and
Faisal. However, the decisional structure remained
unchanged. It was still located within a select group
of people, however, the process changed because of the
new administrative institutions.
The third phase runs from the death of King Faisal
in 1974 to the present. In this period, there was no
new structural or procedural initiatives in the Ulama
or tribal system. However, the emergence of a
technocratic class coupled with increased oil revenues
54
Bligh, From Prince to King, pp. 99-101
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resulted in an expansion of the Council of Ministers
and the inclusion of many young Saudis, all of whom
were Western educated and non-members of the Royal
55
family (see Table 2.2).
The pattern of political change in this period is
reformist. It attempts to satisfy simultaneously the
needs of the new, rising, secular group of technocrats
and the old, theocratic group of the Ulama. The tribal
leaders and their tribes had become easier to control as
they became less powerful. The House of Saud was
attempting to balance the interests and activities of
the groups without affecting the political order. The
third phase witnessed discussions and consultations with
young Saudis to make them feel they have a stake in the
system. The final decision making, however, is still
in the hands of the king and the senior princes.
The second phase of administrative structuring
occurred during the period from 1953-1962. During
this time, senior princes occupied all cabinet positions.
After 1962, key ministries - Defense, Interior and
5 6
Foreign Affairs - are still managed by princes.
Qaundt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's, p. 86.
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Between 1970-75 a technocrat was the foreign
minister. This condition was rectified when the
present incumbent Prince Saud (a Princeton graduate)
was sufficiently groomed for the position.
TABLE 2.2
Saudi Arabian Political Administrative Structure (1987)
The King and Prime Minister
(Fahd)
%
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* Senior princes in cabinet position
** The Wahabbis in cabinet position
*** Technocratic members
Year refers to date of establishment of ministry
SOURCE: THIS TABLE IS DERIVED BY THE AUTHOR FROM HISTORICAL RECORDS AT THE SAUDI
EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
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These ministries play a pivotal role in the maintenance
of internal security, and the formulation, articulation
and implementation of external relations - relations
that (as will be explained in Chapter III) reciprocally
affect the survival of the regime.
The technocratic inclusion in cabinet positions
coincides with the period of high oil revenue which fueled
rapid modernizing tendencies, largely a pcst-1973
development. A common thread in this inclusion is,
again, the nature of ministries allocated to these
technocrats. In most cases they are specialized
ministries that require formal Western education such
as petroleum, planning, labor, social welfare and,
since 1975, finance and national economy. Table 2.3
demonstrates the mechanics of political administrative
control in the kingdomi.
To the Wahabbis belong ministries responsible for
social-ethical control - education and justice. Since
the VJahabbis are religious leaders and because the
legitimacy of the regime is, to a large extent, derived
from Islamiic laws (Shariah) it is natural for the Wahabbis
to manage these two ministries. They are, after all,
theocratic legitimators.
It is obvious that the decisiona1-structural
changes did not accompany innovative procedures introduced
TABLE 2.3
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SOURCE: THIS TABLE IS DERIVED BY THE AUTHOR FROM HISTORICAL RECORDS AT THE SAUDI
EMBASSY IN WAHSINGTON, D.C.
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to meet the needs of a complex Saudi Arabia in the 1970's.
There is no formal political expression in Saudi Arabia;
political parties and trade unions are banned; the press
receives a subsidy and can be closed at the discretion
of the king. The state security lav; of 1981 prescribes
the death penalty or 25 years in jail for any person
convicted of an aggressive act against the Royal family
or the state. The major consequence of the development
of modern Saudi Arabia is the gradual formation of a
religious patriarchy inro an absolute m.onarchy, a
monarchy whose authority is currailed not by the people,
5 8
but by Islamic jurisprudence.
In conclusion, the House of Saud still depends on
religion to legitimize its power, but the tribal system
has been weakened and a nev; educa.ted class has risen to
carry the load. The king and the senior princes continue
io'.ve ver
the new class has the responsibility for implemenring
these decisions. This v;ill be discussed fully in the
next chapter.
:o dominate decisions, both domesric and foreign.
'
Buchan, "Secular and Religious Opposition,
in Saudi Arabia," in Niblcck, Spate, Society, and
Economy in Saudi Arabia, p. 110.
Rustum., Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy, p. 3
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III. SAUDI ARABIAN OIL POLICY: AN ANALYSIS
Saudi Arabia's influence in the v/orld's energy
market derives from its ability to vary rates of oil
production from a low of about 5 million to 6 "illion
barrels per day (bpd) to a maximum of over 10 million
bpd. Its huge oil reserve accounts for about 25 percent
of the \;orld's total reserve v/hile its reserve of
capiral and small population produce a high per capita
1 n c oiplG •
During the 1970's the oil industry was hit by many
devastating events, resulting in an oil shortage and
an increase in oil prices which in turn affected the
v/orld's economy. Such events u-ere the Oil Embargo in
1973, the 1978 oil shortages, and the 1979 oil price
explosion.
In this chapter v;e will examine each event very
carefully, attempting to analyze the Saudis' policy in
each case so as to determine the circumstances and reasons
behind their decisions. As stated in Chapter I, tvvo
conceptual approaches vvill guide this analysis. The
first is the oolitical aocroach and the other is the
41
economic approach. The problem with the economic versus
political dichotomy is that economics and politics
intertwine in a complicated way. Thus, our job here
is to determine which is the more important and v/hich
has the greatest influence on the policy process.
The October 1973 War
On October 6, 1973, v/ar broke out betv/een Israel
and the Arab countries. The Saudis initially did nothing
until October 19, when President Richard M. Nixon asked
the United States Congress to approve $2.2 billion in
emergency military aid to Israel, which was granted.
The-following day, Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil
producing countries announced the halt of all oil exports
to the United States and the Netherlands for their support
59
of Israel. Later, in November 1973, the Arab oil
producing countries decided to cut oil production up to
25 percent by a fixed percentage each month until Israel
6 Q
was forced to withdraw from occupied Arab territories.
This policy affected the oil market, resulting in oil
Abduluziz H. Alsowayyegh, "Saudi Oil Policy
During King Faisal ERA," in Willard A. Belling,
King Faisal and the Modernization of Saudi Arabia
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 209-211.
60
Qaundt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's, p. 128.
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shortages and increased oil prices. Though the policy
had economic consequences, it was undertaken purely
from political considerations. The action was taken
against the Western countries to pressure Israel for the
Arab cause. Thus, v;e need to examine the Saudis' view
toward Palestine and the Arab countries, the objective
reasons for using oil as a political v.’eapon, and the
nature of the Saudis' interaction vvith the Western and
Communist blocs.
We shall first explore the use of oil as a political
weapon. Saudi Arabia opposed using oil as a political
weapon as far back as 1948 , v/hen Israel was created.
The Arab countries called for an oil embargo against
the Wesr, but King Abdulaziz rejected it, believing that
a commercial oil operation should be divorced from
61
political consideration. The issue of using oil as a
political weapon came back v/hen, on June 6 , 1957 , rhe v;ar
between Israel and tiie Arab countries broke out. However,
King Faisal rejected the call from other Arab oil
5 2
producing countries to step the flow or oil ro the West.
George Lenezowski, Oil and State in the
Middle East (Itchaca: Cornell University Press,
1960 ) , p. 188.
G 2
"The Other Face: King Faisal's Cil Policy,"
Sout Altaliah, April, 1976, p. 43.
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As King Faisal said, "It is impossible to mix oil and
1 ■ ..63politics.
In November 1972, Saudi Arabian Minister of
Petroleum Yamani explained the Saudis' inoerpretation
of oil pov/er:
. . .v;e do not believe in ohe use of oil as a
political weapon in a negative manner, we
believe that the best way for the Arabs to
employ their oil is as a basis for orue
cooperation v;ith the West, notably v^ith the
United Stares. In this way very strong
econom.ic ties are established which will
K il
ultimately refleer on our political relations.
A second considerarion is the Saudis' arritude toward
Palestine and the Arab world. The Saudis' position on
the Palestinian issue can be traced back ro the early
years of the Kingdom. On January 8, 1940, and before
the creation of Israel, John Philby, a British advisor
to the king, proposed a plan to King Abdulaziz which 'was
aim:ed toward solving the Israeli-Palestinian problem.
Kis solution was that Palestine snculd be left to the
Jews and displaced Arabs should be resettled elsewhere
ar thie expense of rhe Jews who would place a sum of
200 million pounds sterling at the disposal of the king
for his purpose. The king responded not by punishing
63
'October War," Sour A11 a 1 i a h , Decem.ber, 1973,
6 4
Lackner, A House Built on Sand, p. 119.
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Philby, but by asking him to keep the matter strictly
6 5
confidential. According to Hafiz Vj'ahbah, Saudi Arabian
Ambassador to Britain (1960), Ibn Saud told Philby to
keep the plan strictly confidential because if the other
6 6
Arabs heard about it, he [Philby] would be killed.
King Faisal followed his father's footsteps and never
called for Palestine's liberation, although he continually
6 7
demanded the liberation of East Jerusalem. Both
King Khailid and King Fahd believed the same. For
example. King Fahd once said, "There is no Middle East
6 8
solution until Jerusalem is given back to the Arabs."
In the 1981 Morocco m.eeting of the Arab league. King Fahd
presented his solution to the Middle East problem by
recognizing Israel's right tc exist (see Appendix B).
The Saudis' relationship with the two super pov/er
blocs is more intriguing. Ccm.munism has been described
by King Faisal as an arm of the Jewish world conspiracy.
As he saw it, "The role of the Soviets' presence on Arab
lands as rerjresented in the military and economic
agreements has begun to reveal methods of suppression
65




"King Faisal and the United States,"
Sout Alta liah, March, 1974, p. 5 .
"Documents for the Future," Sout Altaliah,
August, 1979, p. 77.
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and various forms of pressure in favor of Zionism, the
69
first and last mother of communism" King Faisal
reiterated his commitment to the West in his welcoming
speech to President Nixon when he visited Saudi Arabia
in 197 4 :
...and anybody who stands against you
Mr. President in the United States of
America or outside the United States of
America, or stands against us, your friend in
this part of the world, obviously has one aim
in mind, namiely that of causing the splintering
of the world, the bringing about of mischief
which would not be conducive to tranquillity
and peace in the world 70'
The form.er oil minister. Sheik Ya.mani, echoed this view
71
to an American senator, "If you go, we go with you."
We argue that based on these pronouncemients the
Saudis are neither anti-Israel nor pro-Western;
anti-Communist nor supportive of using oil as a
political v;eapon. The question then arises: Why did
his majesty's government endorse Arab initiatives on
the oil embargo against the West? To answer the
question, we must return to history.
When the June 1967 war broke out between Israel
and Saudi Arabia, King Faisal rejected the Arab v.-orld's
Lacknsr, A House Built on Sand, p. 135.
7 0
"Saudi's King Hits Critics of Nixon at Home,
Abroad," VJashinqton Post, 16 June 197 4 , p. 1.
Hobday, Saudi Arabia Today, p. 45.
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call for an oil embargo against the West. As a
result, Saudi workers in tlie oil fields and University
of Petroleum students went on strike, threatening to
blow up the oil fields unless the flow of oil v;as
interrupted. In a dramatic demonstration of emotion
they attached the American consulate and burned the
American flag. Afterwards, the marched to the airport
and military installations where they destroyed the
"Americans' club," cars, and recreation center."^
These demonstrations were repeated in Riyadh where
thousands of people and students from the University of
Riyadh stormed into the streets showing their support
73
for Nasser. These m.ass demonstrations were folro'.;ed
74
by a wave of arrests throughout the country.
Then in 195 9 , there were two attem.pted coups. The
first, in June, was organized by Air Force officers.
The second v'as organized by som>e bourgeois reformers
75
from the Hijaz district. Both failed. We posit that
"The Other Face: King Faisal's Oil Policy,"
Sout Altai!ah, April, 1976, pp. 42-43.
Holden and Johns, The House of Saud, p. 252.
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s phobia of renev;ed internal problems shaped
'
response to the 1973 oil em.bargo intiatives
was also apprehensive about external inter-
Saudi affairs or the probable bombing of the
by outside forces such as the Palestinians,
said:
The Palestinians have given up on their future
and as a result the Palestinians may desrroy
the oil lines to the VJest; thus, it's time for
the United States to pressure the Israelis to
accept the West Bank as an independent homeland
for the Palestinians. The more delay for this
problem t'ne more important the Palestinians
v/ill be and I v;on' t be surprised to see the
Palestinians do something like that.^°
The fear of external interference played a major
role in the Saudis' decision. As Lackner reports,
King Faisal, in May 197 3 , only six m.cnths before the
embargo, told the President of ARAMCO, Carl Jungers,
that Saudi Arabia was nor able ro srand alone much
longer as the U.S.A.'s only friend in the Middle East
and that he was subject to considerable oressure.^ 7
The regime feared that v^ithholding support from the
em.bargo m.ight result i.n the collapse of the dynasty.
This inference is clouded by Yamani's assertion
that "Saudi Arabia knov/s rhar any imbalance in the world
"Saudi Arabia-Am.erica Relarions,"
Sout Altaliah, January, 1980, p. 92
Lackner, A House Built on Sand, p. 12 0.
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economy will result in the communist parties raking over
7 8
the Western countries." King Faisal was also very
much concerned that a world-wide depression might hurt
the United States and the Western countries and at rhe
79
same time help the Eastern bloc. The King said,
"We do not want to do anything that will hurt America,
but if our new special relationship is to rem.ain viable,
8 0
the U.S. must not do anything that v;ill hurt us."
It is true that the Saudis feared a Com.munist takeover
of the world. We insist, however, that the basis for the
fear is the Communist abhorrence of monarchies. The
Saudi government knew that the resilence of the Western
economy w'culd diminish the effect of the embargo even
if it lasted longer. However, the dynasty v;as very
vulnerable to any uprising or to any external interference
such as a Palestinian bombing of the oil fields.
Senator John W. Fulbright said of the Saudis' action:
The Saudis are caught in a dilemma. It is
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible,
for them to accommodate the United States
v;hile the United States provides rhe money
and arms v/hich enable Israel to occupy
Arab lands.
"Invading the Oil Field," Scut Altaliah,
March, 1975, p. 9.
79
"A Year of Costly and Abrupt Changes,"
New York Times, 13 October 1974, p. 47.
8 0
"Arabia's King Faisal Gets Imipatient,"
Newsweek, 30 September 1974, p. 20.
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Holden and Johns, The House of Saud, p. 252.
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Thus, even the West knew that the government was not
anti-Western. King Faisal already provided the
justification: "The U.S. must not do anything that
will hurt us."
1979: Oil Shortages and Spiralling Prices
The Saudis and the Arab countries' reduction in
oil production resulted in oil shortages in the
international market. The consequence was spiralling
oil prices that had a greater impact world-v^ide than
8 2
the embargo. The Yom Kippur War embargo and the cut
in oil production expired before December 1973. It
failed to com.pel an Israeli withdrav/al from the Arab
territories which it occupied after the 1967 war.
In December 1978, the Saudis' oil output was at an all
time high of 10.4 million bpd. This was largely due
to the collapse of Iranian exports. Then on January 20,
1979, the Saudis suddenly announced a cut of production to
9.5 million bpd, then a cut in production during March and
8 3
the rest of the second quarter down to 8.5 million bpd.
Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval
(Littel: Brown, 1982), p. 664.
8 3
Qaundt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's, p. 130.
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The sudden increase and sudden cuts in oil
production imply a contradiction in policies and question
the Saudis' commitment to the West. The Saudis are
v/ithout blame. For if the Shah with all his power could
not deter Khomeini from dethroning him, how could anyone
expect the House of Saud, given its limited power, to
confront Khomeini's Iran?
As a result, oil prices skyrocketed to over $20
a barrel, iv'hereas, they had been under $18 a barrel before.
From April of 197 9 until June, Saudi .Arabian production
dropped to 8.8 million bpd, which resulted in another
price increase - from $21.25 a barrel to $35.40 a barrel
(see Table 3.1). Although the prices had skyrocketed,
the Saudis had undersold the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC). When the price of oil v/as
over $20 a barrel in early 1979, the Saudis sold their
oil for around $16 a barrel. By November when oil v.'as
sold by other OPEC members for more than $28 a barrel,
84
the Saudis sold it for $24 a barrel. Thus, the Saudis
charged substantially less for rhelr oil than cuher
OPEC m.einbers.
The question that needs to be ansv/ered here is v.hat
was the Saudis' policy objective? This motivation could




SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION 1978-80
Output in millions of barrels per day, prices in dollars
OUTPUT AND PRICE JAN FEB MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
1978
Saudi Output 7.8 8.4 7.7 8.1 7.3 7.6 7.4 7.2 8.4 9.3 10.3 10.4
Percent of OPEC 28 29 26 27 26 26 26 24 26 29 32 34
Contract Price 12.70 12.70 12.70 12.70 12.70 12.70 12.70 12.70 12.70 12.70 12.70 12.70
Spot Price 12.86 • • • 12.73 • * • . • . 12.78 12.98 18.73 19.80
1979
Saudi Output 9.8 9.8 9.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.7 9.8 9.8
Percent of OPEC 34 33 32 28 28 28 31 31 32 31 32 32
Contract Price 13.34 13.34 13.34 14.55 14.55 14.55 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 24.00 24.00
Spot Price 16.24 22.56 22.38 21.25 28.94 35.40 33.13 33.80 35.00 38.00 41.00 41.00
1980
Saudi Output 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.7 10.3 10.3 10.3
Percent of OPEC 33 33 34 35 36 36 36 37 39 44 43 41
Contract Price 26.00 26.00 26.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 32.00 32.00
Spot Price 38.13 36.00 35.94 35.67 36.22 36.00 34.60 31.94 32.92 38.00 41.25 40.60
SOURCE: Qaundt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's, p. 178.
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From the economic point of v'iew, some experts have
argued that production was cut because extra production
would exhaust Saudi Arabia's oil reserve. Such cuts
would therefore save the reserve for generations to come
because, as we know, oil is the only natural resource
Saudi Arabia has. This argument cannot be sustained
especially since Saudi Arabia was producing beyond its
needs just to satisfy the demands of the West. As Yamani
in a January 14, 1976, statement put it, "Saudi Arabian
oil production new- is far more than vnhat our needs are,
but as a result of the world's increased need for oil,
we will exhaust our reserve to satisfy the v.’orld's need."
Furthermore, the Saudis' action could be explained as a
strategy to increase oil prices which in turn would
increase oil revenues. Bur the Saudis consistently under
sold other OPEC members at all times, and. they have
previously lobbied against any oil price increase.
In 1974 King Faisal, in a most unusual gesture, wrote a
personal letter to the Shah of Iran urging him to join
Saudi Arabia in lcv;ering the oil price, which '.ras $11.65
3 6
a barrel, but the Shah ct Iran refused. ‘ As a result,
in 'larch 1975, King Faisal refused to attend the first
.meeting of the heads of state of the oil exoortinc
85
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"A Year of Costly Gil and Abrupt Changes,
New York Times, 13 October 1974, p. 47.
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countries. At the meeting the Saudi delegation opposed
the call by Iran, Algeria, Libya, and Iraq to increase
oil prices. It also refused to consider proposals
presented by Iran, Algeria and other oil exporting
countries to effect production cutbacks in order to
87
increase prices. The Saudis studiously resisted attempts
to increase oil prices throughout this period. For
example, in December 1976, after meeting in Doha, Qatar,
most OPEC members called for an immediate 10 percent
price increase, to be followed by another 5 percent
increase in 1977. Saudi Arabia, joined only by the United
Arab Emirates, held out for a 5 percent increase only.
By mid-1977, the Saudis agreed to raise their prices by
an additional 5 percent. In return, the other OPEC
members agreed to freeze prices for the rest of the year.
To back its position, the Saudi government kept production
8 8
high through 1977, averaging about 9.2 million bpd.
Also as a result of the Iranian revolution in 1978 and
the collapse of Iranian exports, the Saudis increased
oil production to 10.4 million bpd to make up for the
lost Iranian oil. This was an action by the Saudis
to save the world from any oil shortages and from an
89
increase in oil prices.
8 7
Rustum, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy, p. 122.
8 8




The economic motivation argument could be dismissed
on the grounds that the Saudis' action was taken m.ostly
to protect the world and especially the Vvest from an
energy crisis which might lead to a Communist takeover
of the West. But the Saudis did cut oil production which
resulted in the price increase. This action contradicts
the Saudi-issued statements, as we stated above. In
addition, on May 29, 1979, during the Saudis' oil cuts,
Crown Prince Abdullah said that Saudi Arabia "understands
the imporrance and duty of Saudi Arabia tcv.’ard world
stability; thus, Saudi Arabia v;ill make sure that oil
90
will not be used as an instrument to pressure others.
Ke was followed by Yamani on June 14, 1979, who said,
"Saudi Arabia, as the biggest oil producing counrry in
the world, rejects any future oil embargo against the
91
West." ^
Even while the Saudis were issuing these starenents,
their oil production v;as cut and prices went up. The
regimie knew that these policies were bruising the West
in parricular and the world in general. The question is
v;hat made the Saudis do what they did? To answer this
question, v;e need to explore an iimportant event in 197'^.







In early February, the Iranian Revolution succeeded
as the Shah's regime finally collapsed. Khomeini's
government critized Saudi oil policy for producing
92
too much oil at low prices. Khomeini did not stop
there. He called upon Arab countries and the Muslim
world to rid themselves of their oppressive leaders and
join Iran in its Islamic cause. Further, he promised
that Iran would export the Islamic revolution to all
93
neighboring countries. The Saudis' oil cut took place
precisely when Khomeini took over in February 1979 (see
Table 3.1). V^hat is interesting is that in October 1980 ,
the Saudis increased oil production back to 10,4 million
94
bpd, at a time when the Iran-Iraqi war was taking place.
Clearly, the Saudis no longer felt pressures from Iran
to hold down oil production. The answer then to our
question is that the Saudis' fear of any kind of
confrontation with Khomeini or escalation in the region
made them do what they promised not to do--reduce oil
production.
We, therefore, posit that the Saudis' policy decisions
during the 1973 oil embargo and the 1979 oil production
fluctuations resulted from political pressure. A very
Qaundt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's, p. 131.
93
"Saudi Arabia-American Relations,"
Sout Altaliah, January, 1980, p. 96.
94
Qaundt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's, p. 133.
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perceptive comment came from the U.S. Deputy Secretary
of Energy, John Sav/hill, who said:
Future Saudi production is primarily a
political decision; for its own foreign
exchange needs, Saudi Arabia has to produce
less than 5 million bpd. However, Saudi
Arabia has a great interest in the political
stability of the financial markets. ^
Clearly, political motivation was what shaped the
Saudis' oil decision, and this polirical morivarion
was derived from fear and pressure. The regime feared
that the citizens might revolt in 1973 as they did in
1967. It feared reprisals from external Arab radical
movem.ents if iz opposed an oil embargo. Ir feared
Khomeini's retaliation for over producing and under
pricing.
The Saudis are under pressure for protecni.’-g the
West in t}ie oil markets, a protection they offer on
some occasions, but net on others., Tliis analysis suggests
that dynastic survival is a paramount consideration while
the interest of its Western allies is secondary even
if the regim.e needs the W’est to ensure an enduring dynasty.
David Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia
W'estview Press, 1985), p. 132.London:
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IV. CONCLUSION
Secrecy and centralization dominate the formulation
of Saudi Arabian oil policy. The king and senior
princes make decisions, v/hile technocrats implement
them. The centralization is demonstrated in our
analysis. However, the study reveals that oil policy
decisions are generally taken out of fear, and/or as
a result of external pressure.
The kingdom's sensitivity to conflict or pressure
in the Arabian Gulf was substantiated during the 1973
Arab-Israeli war and the Khomeini revolution which
preceded tiie 1978-79 oil shortages. Although the regime
claimed to be interested in using oil to .maintain
international stability, its oil policies at the time
gave no indication of such objectives. Clearly, the
policy was aimed at the sustenance of the dynasty.
When Saudi Arabia in 1973 supported the oil embargo
and interrupted oil production, it was an action
predicated on fear; fear of internal disrurbances and
fear of sabotage to the oil fields. Similarly, the
regime's fear of Khomeini and a possible Iranian strike
on their oil fields impelled its 1979 oil reduction polic
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VJe argue that the government is constantly pressured,
crisis or no crisis. A m.ajor pressure block is the West,
a situation that is not alleviated by the regime's
commitment to the West to maintain an appropriate level
of supply that meets Western needs and to support low/er
prices in opposition to the Saudi people and other OPEC
members. In return, the West, through the United States,
is to provide a badly needed protective umbrella. Out
of fear and under pressure v/ithout planning or study,
the Saudis make decisions V'.'hich are reactions to events.
However, the Saudis' actions in 197 3 and in 197 9 shov.'ed
their lack of trust in Western prorection. The Saudis
are not ready to take a chance and test the West.
The regimie' s sensitivities derive from two historical
sources. The first is a lingering memory of the destruction
of the first Saudi dynasty by external forces and cf the
second dynasty by inoernal forces as was discussed in
Chapter I. Secondly, the regime is painfully cognizant
of the experience of neighboring dynasties. They
remember tne collapse of the Farouk dynasty in Egypt
(1952), riie King Faisal dynasty in Iraq ( 1956), the
Idrissi dynasty^ in Libya {1970), and most recently the
Pahlevi d’ynasty in Iran ( 1979 ). These dynasties were
all overthrown by'- radical leaders who came to the region
v;ith nascent and eclectic ideologies such as nationalism.
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baathism, socialism, communism and Islamicism. These
ideologies are perceived by the Saadis as disruptive
precepts that serve only the Zionist and Soviet
interests in the Arab world.
We have determined that the Saudis' main policy
objective is the survival of the dynasty. This objective
is, however, dependent on internal and external stability.
In other words, there is a reciprocal relationship between
internal and external stability. For the only way the
Saudis believe stability can be achieved is by ridding
the Arab world of radical movem.ents. And the only way
to do that is to achieve peace in the Middle East. Thus,
the failure to solve the Palestinian problem, in the Saudis'
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eyes, will promote left wing movements in the Arab world.
Second, a stable, healthy Western economy will
result in a stable world economy, which the Saudis
believe will in turn rid the world of radicalism,
socialism, and communism. By contrast, the Saudis believe
that a weak world economy may result in socialist parties
taking over V'Jestern governments.
The House cf Saud has survived all attempts to
overthrov/ the present dynasty throughout the years.
The policy of reacting to crises episodically and
balancing relations between allies and potential
96
Qaundt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's, p. 17.
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adversaries by maintaining, on the one hand, the allies'
empathy while, on rhe other hand, avoiding serious
conflict with their adversaries has served tl'jem w'ell.
The regime survived the massive waves of radical movement
v/hich v;ere so popular in the Middle East during the late
1950's and the late 1960's. During this period, it
successfully stemm.ed wa\.'es of nationalism from Egypt,
baathism from Iraq and Syria, and a spill-over effecr
of a civil war in North Yemen. In addirion, internally,
the government had to fight new, potentially thriving
anti-Saudi movements of socialism and nationalism to
v;hich King Faisal responded v;ith the power of the sword.
After a coup attempt against the House of Saud in
1969 by the Air Force, the regime was fortunate to
experience a tranquil and stable period unoi] the seizure
of the Grand Mosque in Mecca on November 20th, 1979,
by a few hundred Muslim fundamientalists under the
leadership of Junaiman. This crisis lasted abour tv.-o
w'eeks, but it showed how very vulnerable and shaky the
House of Saud was. The regime over reacted by cutring
all international communications, by helicopter bombing
of the hciy Mosque coupled with armored rank assault,
and, finally, by seeking the assisrance of the Jordanians
special squad. The miassive overkill is indicative cf a
Holden and Johns, The House of Saud, pp. 512-26
This m.ovement was anti-corporatic'n and one Saudi fast
modernization of the ccunory.
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nervous regime. But this crisis also indicated that the
House of Saud enjoys tremendous support from the people
of Saudi Arabia who sent hundreds of thousands of letters
through the newspapers to the King endorsing his actions
93
and declaring that they were "behind him all the way."
This surprising massive support intuitively provided the
regime insight into an alternate strategy for ensuring
the survival of the dynasty against external aggressors.
As we stated before, Saudi Arabia is surrounded by many
countries with radical governments such as Iran to the
west, Syria and Iraq to the north. South Yemen to the
south, and Ethiopia to the west. To contend with this
threat, Saudi Arabia, in addition to promoting peace in
the Middle East and maintaining friendly relations with
its neighbors, especially the radical ones, sought the
protection of a third party such as Pakistan. As of
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August 1980, it was widely reported that Saudi Arabia
has signed a military agreement with Pakistan. According
to the agreement, Saudi Arabia will provide Pakistan with
one billion dollars in aid annually, while the Pakistan
government will supply Saudi Arabia v/ith ground forces
and advisors to be stationed primarily at the South Yemen
border area.
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At the same time, the Saudis, with the
9 8
"Documents for the Future," Sout Altaliah,
January, 1980, p. 80.
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help of American companies, built two huge military cities,
one at the northern border with Iraq and Syria, which
they called King Fahid City, and the other one at the
southwest near Ethiopia and North Yemen, called King Khalid
City.
This researcher believes, hov/ever, that in spire
of these security measures the Saudis will again be
compelled to use oil as a weapon in any future Arab-
Israeli V7ar or as a result of pressure from radical
countries in the region such as Iran or Iraq.
My own prediction is that the Saudi dynasry will be
there for many years to come for two reasons. The first
reason is that the Saudi people showed in 1979 during the
•holy Mosque takeover how supportive they are of the Saudi
dynasty. The Saudi people sav/ the failure of the other
Arabian juntas ai'd revoluoionaries of the 196C's tc effect
a social transformation of their countries, to assure a
better future, and to guarantee human rights. In addition,
the Saudi people are economiically satisfied, and they
fear that a coup or a revolution v;culd result in a bloody
civil war* over who could or should control pcwer. Th.e
second reason I believe the Saudj dynasty v.’ill prevail
is that externally ri;e Saudis are very careful in all
their relations with their neighbors. They have success¬
fully avoided all kinds of conflicts and foiled any
external aggression against the kingdom.
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Hov;ever, a major problem threatens the future of the
dynasty: corruption. Corruption in Saudi Arabia has
reached unbelievable dimensions. For example, a
prince is rumored to earn one hundred million dollars
in a single transaction. Such occurrences create questions
among the new generations of the Saudi people. Thus,
it is important for the House of Saud, especially in the
1980's and beyond, to control and limit corruption which
assumed a geometrical growth rate in the 1970's.
In the 1970's, Saudi Arabian revenues were so high
that by the end of 1980, the Saudis had about a
$120 billion surplus. Thus, the citizens were receiving
government subsidies and were not as sensitive to
corrupt practices as they are now that revenues and
government subsidies have dropped. As a result of
Icvv’er oil prices, Saudi revenues dropped from $95 billion
in 1980 to less them $40 billion in 1982, resulting in
a cut of governm>ent spending. In turn, cuts in
government spending affect the entire economic sector
of the country. Consequently, the people are not as
busy as before. Now, they are more attentive to gossip
about who took what and how m.uch, a process which may
diminish the prestige and encourage resentment of the
Royal family.
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By limiting and controlling corruption on
hand while on the other hand preserving a stabl




subjects and ensure its survival indefinitely.
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KING ABDULAZIZ'S SONS' NAMES ACCORDING TO AGE
NAME BIRTHDATE NAME BIRTHDATE
1. Tourki 1900 18 . Abdulrehman 1931
2. Saud 1902 19 . Tourki (2) 1932
3. Faisal 1906 20 . Badir 1932
4. Mohanuned 1912 21. Nawaf 19 33
5 . Khalid 1913 22 . Naif 1933
6. Nasser 1919 23 . Fawaz 1934
7 . Saad 1919 24 . Ma jed 1936
8. Fahd 1920 25 . Salmon 1936
9. Mansour 1920 26 . Abdulelah 1938
10 . Abdulah 1921 27 . Ahmad 1939
11. Bander 1922 28 . Satam 1940
12 . Sultan 1922 29 . Thamir 1940
13. Moushal 1925 30 . Mamdouh 1941
14 . Mousaad 1927 31. Mashhour 1941
15. Adbulmouhsin 1930 32 . Houmod 1941
16. Motab 1931 33 . Abdulmajid 1942
17 . Talal 1931 34 . Mougrin 1942
SOURCE: Qaundt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980's, p. 172.
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KING FAHD'S MIDDLE EAST PROPOSAL
1. Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied
in 1967, includinq East Jerusalem.
2. The removal of Israeli settlements on Arao land
established after 1967.
3. Guaranteed freedom of 'worship for all religions in the
Holy place.
4. Affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to
return to their homes and compensation to those who
decide not to do so.
5. United Nations control of the West Sank and Gaza Strip
for a transnational period not exceeding a fev; months.
6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state
with Jerusalem as its capital.
7. Affirmation of the right of all states in the region
to live in peace.
8. The UN or some of its members to guarantee and implement
these principles.
SOURCE: Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia, .24 .
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